I) Work in Progress

• The Aristotelian Society, 2018, at Oxford: a talk about justifying the omission of morally good deeds;
• Resubmission: On Why There Is a Problem of Supererogation;
• Tinkering with a new paper about the utility of allowing offences and suberogation (Hallie Liberto (2011) vs. Julia Driver (1992));
• Other papers submitted for publication: Susan Wolf on Morality's Dark Side and Justifying Omissions of  Morally Good Deeds;
• A very short paper about the meaning of the term "desire"

II) Recent work ​

• Workshop at the Jefferson Foundation, UVA, Nov. 2017 : Normativity and Supererogation.

III) Older Projects:

• The Aristotelian Society  in 2015: On the Difficulty of Accounting for Supererogation -- Abstract:

If one accepts the existence of supererogatory action (i.e. that there are morally good, altruistic deeds that cannot be required and one cannot be blamable for omitting them), then one accepts that there are morally good, even morally excellent actions that cannot be required from us. The focus of my research is not providing an answer to the question 'why would someone be allowed to omit to do something obviously good?'. Instead, I am offering an explanation for why this question seems to be so difficult to answer. My claim is that the question itself is conceptually framed in a manner that makes a plausible theoretical account for supererogation very difficult to achieve. I will follow the difficulties in accounting for supererogation in Thomas Nagel (1986), Joseph Raz (1975) and Susan Wolf (1982). 

• An older publication:​ Michael Beaney on Frege and the Paradox of Analysis in Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 7, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 487-498.

If you are interested in any of these as a full text, let me know.